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Preface 
This is a book about and supportive of a particular kind of populist democracy—
“populism” for short. It may seem a little surprising to see a book of this type these days, because 
the term “populism” has become something of a dirty word over the last couple of decades.1 
Even one who is not made uncomfortable just by hearing the term “populism” uttered without 
disdain is likely to wonder which of the two main types of populism I am talking about. In his 
widely read work on the history of American populism, Michael Kazin (2017) distinguishes 
“left-wing” (or socialist) populism of the early 20th Century Progressive movement, from the 
arguably nativist and xenophobic “right-wing” variety that has been credited with the rise to 
power of Donald Trump in the United States, Boris Johnson in England, and Jair Bolsonaro in 
Brazil. However, as I understand the term “populism,” if we strain away most of the goals of 
those identified by its supporters and just concentrate on its democratic essence, while it may be 
susceptible to both left- and right-wing varieties, it is not particularly conducive to either one. 
 
Nativism, Progressivism, Randy Newman, and Frank Capra 
 
It is worth noting that, while Kazin has traced the history of the two “common man” 
strains of American populism in an engaging fashion, it is doubtful whether they’re cleanly 
 
1 For two recent almost simultaneous examples of that sort of usage, see Yascha Mounk, 
2019 and Debora MacKenzie, 2019.  
 
 
separable. Consider, for example, Randy Newman’s apt representation of a Huey Long supporter 
at the time of the New Deal: 
 
Kingfish 
Who built the highway to Baton Rouge? 
Who put up the hospital and built your schools? 
Who looks after shit-kickers like you? 
The Kingfish do 
 
Kingfish, Kingfish 
Everybody sing 
Kingfish, Kingfish 
Every man a king 
Who took on the Standard Oil men 
And whipped their ass 
Just like he promised he'd do? 
Ain't no Standard Oil men gonna run this state 
Gonna be run by little folks like me and you 
Kingfish, Kingfish 
Friend of the working man 
Kingfish, Kingfish 
The Kingfish gonna save this land (Newman, 1974A) 
 
 
It cannot be doubted that the sentiment expressed here is quintessential socialist 
populism. But is the singer/narrator entirely separable from the “redneck” Lester Maddox 
supporter depicted in another Newman song from the same album when the spirit of the 
following Dixie generation is invoked? 
Rednecks 
Last night I saw Lester Maddox on a TV show 
With some smart-ass New York Jew 
And the Jew laughed at Lester Maddox 
And the audience laughed at Lester Maddox too 
 
Well he may be a fool but he's our fool 
If they think they're better than him they're wrong 
So I went to the park and I took some paper along 
And that's where I made this song 
 
We talk real funny down here 
We drink too much and we laugh too loud 
We're too dumb to make it in no Northern town 
And we're keepin' the n*****s down 
 
We’re rednecks, we're rednecks 
We don't know our ass from a hole in the ground 
We're rednecks, we're rednecks 
 
 
And we're keepin’ the n*****s down (Newman, 1974B)2 
The aspirations of these two narrators may be somewhat different, but the boundaries 
between their two spirits are undeniably fuzzy. The moral that may be taken from both songs is, 
roughly, You don’t get to tell us what to do just because we’re not “bigshots” like you. In 
America, we get to tell YOU what to do. That, as Kazin confirms, has always been the rough 
basis for American populism. And that is simply a democratic motif that needs to be explained 
and either justified or rebuked. But because populism has been thought of in the U.S. as more of 
a movement (or bunch of movements) than as a philosophy or theory of government, there has 
been what seems me to be an excessive concentration on the ethos and not much analysis of the 
theoretical underpinnings. Naturally, if one looks at slogans rather than either axioms or what 
follows from them, one is likely to find goals rather than justifications. As Newman’s songs 
show, the goals might be increased socialism just as easily as decreased racial diversity.  
It is interesting to note how distasteful populist ideals are to both standard conservatives 
and standard liberals. One of the former asked me recently, “If we lock our doors against 
possible thieves, why should we think it would be perfectly fine if those same miscreants ran the 
country? Isn’t it obvious that they would quickly repeal all the laws against burglary? Let’s face 
it, a call for ‘radical democracy’ is just fancy a way of handing over all the power to residents of 
the American megalopolis—and we know how rapacious that group is!” But liberals are no less 
suspicious: “Although we may try with all our might, it is quite likely that there will always be 
 
2 These excerpts from “Kingfish” © 1974 (renewed) WB Music Corp. and Randy 
Newman Music, and “Rednecks” © 1974, 1975 (renewed) WB Music Corp. are used by 
permission of Alfred Music, Inc. All rights are reserved by the copyright holders. 
 
 
more uneducated bigots than people who are actually capable of understanding the fine points of 
governance. If you let the uneducated run the country, policies will not only be shortsighted, but 
racist, xenophobic and gun-crazy.” 
It may be noted that even when neither socialism nor nativism has been particularly 
prevalent among those pushing for more democracy (or both incentives have been cleverly 
cloaked), one can often make out a kind of sentimental patriotism combined with the 
glorification of "the little guy." Many examples of that sort of vague populism can be found in 
the movies of Frank Capra. Consider the following excerpt from Meet John Doe (Riskin, 1941).  
I'm gonna talk about us, the average guys, the John Does. If anybody 
should ask you what the average John Doe is like, you couldn't tell him 
because he's a million and one things....  
 
He's Joe Doakes, the world's greatest stooge and the world's greatest 
strength. Yessir, we're a great family, the John Does. We're the meek who 
are supposed to inherit the earth. You'll find us everywhere. We raise the 
crops, we dig the mines, work the factories, keep the books, fly the planes 
and drive the busses! 
 
We've existed since time began. We built the pyramids, we saw Christ 
crucified, pulled the oars for Roman emperors, sailed the boats for 
Columbus, retreated from Moscow with Napoleon and froze with 
Washington at Valley Forge! 
 
 
 
I know a lot of you are saying "What can I do? I'm just a little punk. I 
don't count." Well, you're dead wrong! The little punks have always 
counted because in the long run the character of a country is the sum total 
of the character of its little punks.3 
Like Randy Newman’s songs, Frank Capra’s movies try to capture a feeling rather than a 
philosophy. And it is precisely that feeling that populist movements have tried to sell in order to 
gain purchase among the big political parties. Whether a particular version has been "left" or 
"right"—whether the chant has been "Banks got bailed out, we got sold out!" or "The Jews will 
not replace us!" the means to the end (redistributive or homogeneous) has clearly involved a type 
of comradery that has this at its core: We little guys get to run the country—not the banks, not 
the politicians, not the professors. Maybe it is, as the socialist might think, because we’re the 
ones who built the pyramids and dug the mines; or maybe, as the nativist might think, it is 
because we’re the only ones who came from these parts (or from a country where people tend to 
have the same skin color as Washington and Jefferson). Or perhaps it’s because we’re the ones 
who have died in the wars—rather than the generals, the Standard Oil millionaires, or the Wall 
Street financiers. In any case, to the extent that the history of populism is a story of what has 
driven “popular movements,” a kind of “People’s History of the United States,” Kazin has done 
a creditable job telling it, and I won’t have a great deal to add to that story here.4 
 
3 This excerpt from the Meet John Doe screenplay is used by the generous permission of 
Pat McGilligan. 
4 I will note, however, that I find it odd that in discussing the progressive variants of 
populism, Kazin makes no mention of the classic books of Herbert Croly, Walter Lippman, or 
 
 
As indicated, all the strains of populism have certain common entailments as well as a 
common feel or motif. There is a resentment of bigshots, of elites. Whether it comes from a racial 
or ethnic group or from Nixon’s so-called “silent majority,” and whether it aims its fear and 
loathing at Wall Street bankers or Mexican immigrants, most populisms have the theme that 
Someone is preventing us from getting a fair shake, an equal opportunity to get what WE want. I 
hope to show in this book that this complaint is actually defensible and needs no additional left- 
or right-wing feel or justification. There is, and always has been, not only in the U.S., but in 
nearly every polity in the history of the world, a failure to guarantee the fair opportunity for 
people to indicate what they want and make their governments at least try to obtain it for them. 
What I attempt to show here is precisely how a democratic polity must be governed to provide 
such assurance. Furthermore, I believe that the “distilled populism” presented here—or 
something very much like it—can help answer the question of why anybody ought to be 
expected to follow a law he or she doesn’t personally agree with. Either significant dilution or 
significant expansion of its principles may result in legitimate rebellions both big and small, 
because the reasonable expectation of deference to the majority may disappear if substantial 
alterations are made to the model.  
 
Walter Weyl (the highly influential founders of The New Republic) or of W. S. U’Ren, who was 
largely responsible for bringing the initiative petition and referendum to Oregon and who tried 
valiantly to establish proportional representation and the Single Tax there as well. He also sites 
no works by Charles Beard or J. Allen Smith, the greatest of the progressive historians. This is 
also true of Goodwyn’s (1976) celebrated history of American populism, which does not even 
mention Teddy Roosevelt. In any case, those missing thinkers and ideas are among the main 
influences here. 
 
 
Of course, many have argued that no version of populism ought to be allowed to come 
into being because every species of it poses real dangers to life, liberty, and property in any 
country in which it dominates. It is even claimed that every-populist government can only 
devolve into fascism or other type of mob rule. How, after all, can a radical democracy not be 
tyrannical? Isn’t that why Madison and the other Founding Fathers wisely gave us a 
representative republic instead? A major focus of this book is to respond to those claims, so that 
arguments according to which any democracy worthy of the name must provide a fair 
opportunity for group members to get what they want can be heard without fear or loathing. In 
other words, whether the procedures advocated here produce governmental policies which we 
approve or abhor, a road is described to a contentment with the manner in which policies are 
arrived at that far exceeds what any feebler democracy can provide. And this attitude may extend 
even to those cases where we find the results of some less democratic “republic” more congenial. 
Thus, I will be writing about premises that all defensible populisms involve—whether or not 
their left- or right-wing supporters have always realized it. And I will attempt to describe the 
sorts of procedures that can be expected to result from those premises in a neutral manner. What 
I will not attempt, however, is to find some supposed essence of populism, a quest that has been 
sensibly derided by Margaret Canovan (1981). For “populism” is a term that applies to a wide 
family of actual and possible arrangements and, even if they all have one or two characteristics 
in common, other, non-populistic polities might share those characteristics as well. My goal is 
rather to uncover foundations that can be used to support a number of populist arrangements. i.e., 
reasons why such (perhaps ideal) polities and only such polities should be considered worthy 
democracies.5 
 
5 It is illustrative to consider that Nadia Urbinati, a theorist I quite admire, would likely 
 
 
“Democracy Yes, Populism No!” 
Now, it cannot be denied that, during the same half-century that has produced the 
increasing dread of populism described above, there has also been a stream of literature urging 
the expansion of democracy. Huge numbers of works have been published calling for more 
frequent votes, more (and more carefully delineated) parliamentary deliberation, and more varied 
sorts of citizen participation. That current levels of democracy are regularly derided as obviously 
insufficient can be gleaned from the opening lines of Shapiro (2003, 1) when he tells us that 
"The democratic idea is close to non-negotiable in today’s world.” This is because, as he 
explains, it is not only that every group wanting power claims to be more democratic than the 
system or leaders they want to replace, but also because apparently non-democratic regimes tend 
to vacillate among (i) “We are actually much more democratic than we may seem”; (ii) “Any 
deficiencies are not our fault, but that of some intrusive foreign power(s)”; and (iii) “We’ll get to 
it as soon as the population is ready for it.” In other words, at the same time that additional 
democracy has been dreaded as a likely precursor to fascism, it has also been urged as being 
absolutely necessary to anything like a peaceful and prosperous nation. “Democracy”—whatever 
it may mean exactly—has thus come to have a sort of religious glow: no polity can be decent or 
“just” without displaying a lot of it. 
Perhaps this sort of “it’s ruinous!” “It’s indispensable!” dialectic is unavoidable: surely it 
has been around since the Ancient Greeks argued about the value of popular input to 
 
classify many of the mechanisms defended here as plebiscitarian rather than populistic. I note, 
however, that her take on the nature of a plebiscite is narrower than what I mean by that term.  
 
 
governmental rule-making.6 It is worth noting, however, that the idea that democracy is an 
intrinsic good that is beyond reproach has never been particularly widespread in the United 
States. There has always been a very substantial segment of the population, perhaps even a 
majority, who, since the time of John Adams and James Wilson, have been horrified by the idea 
of “government by the mob.” While the radicals, the Tom Paines and early 20th Century 
Progressives, have popped up from time to time, they have rarely (if ever) ruled the roost, and 
are, like Presidents Teddy and Franklin Roosevelt, Andrew Jackson, Jimmy Carter, and (at least 
on some issues) Donald Trump, mostly admired or scorned for their aspirations and outcomes 
rather than for the theoretical underpinnings of their views.7 This is, no doubt, partly because 
those underpinnings are items that these leaders may have been only dimly aware of themselves.  
Here in the U.S., as scary as any sort of popular sovereignty has generally seemed since 
the French Revolution, extreme versions of it have been even less respectable. There may be the 
occasional firebrands of the “right” or “left” who will dare mention the word “populism” in 
public,8 but the academy has spoken against anything bearing that title with near unanimity. To 
give just one recent example, William Galston (2018, 4-5) has warned that  
Populists view themselves as arch-democrats who oppose what they 
regard as liberalism’s class biases. Their majoritarianism puts pressure on 
the individual rights and the limits on public power at the heart of liberal 
 
6 This is a recurrent theme of Ernesto Laclau 2005. 
7 For an excellent explanation of why Jimmy Carter makes this list, see Canovan 1991, 
269-73. 
8 See, e.g., Thomas Frank, 2018.  
 
 
democracy. More dangerous still is the populists’ understanding of the 
“people” as homogeneous and unitary…. Faced with disagreement, 
populism responds with anathemas: the dissenters are self-interested, 
power-hungry elites who aren’t part of the virtuous and united people. 
They are rather the enemies of the people and deserve to be treated as 
such. 
I therefore want to emphasize at the outset that the distilled populism I promote here bears only 
limited connection to the populisms trenchantly criticized not only in Galston’s work, but in a 
large number of other recent books and papers.9  
Let me again stress that the defense of populist theory provided here comes from a 
perspective that would neither blame nor praise democratic procedures for outcomes we may or 
may not enjoy. I take no positions (at least not here) on redistribution of wealth, public 
ownership of utilities, open borders, the taxing of billionaires, gun ownership, NATO, or green 
energy. I believe instead that, whatever my own views on these subjects, the majority principle 
ought to apply and we mostly need to figure out how to find the majority will and implement it 
appropriately.  
But how is it possible to remain aloof from all the pressing, sometimes existential 
problems facing contemporary polities? Furthermore, why should democratic theory shy away 
from what really matters—things like avoiding nuclear war and maintaining an environment our 
children will be able to live in? These are good questions, but the answers to them may be 
simpler than we think. When we “naturalize” democratic theory by eschewing Platonistic 
 
9 See, e.g., Urbinati’s body of work on the subject. 
 
 
understandings of “the good,” we will see the point of repositioning arguments for particular 
political goals. If we come to understand the connection between a prudential value—what it is 
that actually makes a single life or a group of lives better—and what people want, we may begin 
to embrace a democratic theory that is merely consistent with many of the particular political 
results listed above, but neither requires nor prohibits any of them. This will be possible with a 
theory that is indifferent to whether or not you or I happen to agree with this or that vision of 
desired political outcomes ourselves. Distilled populism allows us to conclude that many of our 
own views regarding public policy, justice or morality have no special standing, that to the extent 
the redistribution or climate-change questions involve value judgments, what we must do first—
before pushing our own particular values—is find out what the people actually want. So, what 
may seem like an aloofness to political outcomes in this book results from the belief that my own 
view on this or that issue is to a significant extent nothing more than that (unless I can get others 
to agree with it). In other words, populism, rightly construed, suggests that our first duty is to try 
to understand what would make our polity better off based solely on the aggregated desires of all 
constituents—whatever we might want ourselves. We are not foreclosed from pushing for this or 
that outcome—and, as we shall see, there are good reasons for seeking empirical support for the 
“value-free” portions of our positions—but the higher and first goal is always to ensure 
appropriate democratic mechanisms, so that every person’s attitude will be given fair 
consideration.  
Before we grasp the nature of prudential values and their relation to voting, we are likely 
to find this notion perplexing. But when we come to understand what democracy actually means 
and entails, we may find ourselves pressing our own views—other than those involving 
democratic procedures—with a bit more humility. It’s not that they no longer matter to us: we 
may still be staunch socialists or Bible-revering evangelists. But we may come to understand that 
 
 
it is the democratic principles that must take priority in every polity that can claim to be self-
governed. 
In my view, those who give non-democracy-enhancing goals primacy do not only get 
priorities wrong; they will not be able to make good cases for the positions they do exalt, because 
there will be no compelling first principles that they can rely on when others disagree with them. 
In fact, I will argue here that to the extent to which theorists fail to rely on a naturalized theory of 
democracy of the sort propounded here, whatever species of Liberalism or Conservatism they 
happen to favor will likely be rootless as well as inconsistent with our most basic concepts of 
popular sovereignty. If we believe in democracy at all, we will have to come to terms with the 
fact that democratic governments must be “by, and for the people,” institutions that endeavor to 
get for their members no more and no less than what those members want. Distilled populism by 
definition requires (and says little more than) this, but, simple as it seems, every form of 
traditional Liberalism and Conservatism is antithetical to it. I will not insist that both “Liberal 
Democracy” and “Conservative Democracy” are oxymorons; it may well be that the term 
“democracy” is now squishy enough that a government that isn’t literally “by and for the people” 
can be called democratic or “a democratic republic” without contradiction. I do think, though, 
that the most basic sense of “government by the people” has been lost within most current and 
traditional arrangements. 
Many will chafe at the idea that a new theory of democracy is of any use at all. The 
comments of one left-leaning friend of mine nicely exemplify that attitude. At the suggestion that 
further theoretical work may be needed on questions of appropriate democratic rule, he 
responded that we must rely on people’s integrity, since without that, no procedural safeguards 
would be meaningful. He pointed out that when a dissident in China recently argued that he 
should not be prosecuted since the Chinese constitution guarantees free speech, the court simply 
 
 
replied that that protection applies only to utterances expressing praise of the Chinese 
Communist Party. My friend took this to imply that governments will provide the greatest good 
for the greatest number only when those in power want that, since no government will be 
praiseworthy if it’s run by people mostly interested in retaining their power, prestige or wealth. 
After all, he asked, didn’t Kwame Nkrumah, the former Prime Minister and President of Ghana, 
once express bewilderment at the idea that those with the guns would voluntarily give up power 
to those without them? Isn’t it just human nature to place loyalty to one’s own religion, wealth or 
tribe above any feelings for one’s nation? On his skeptical view, governmental documents like 
constitutions and their apparently democratic institutions, for all their nice talk about freedom 
and security, will do absolutely nothing without the support of those in power, so analyzing 
problems with democratic mechanisms is a fool’s errand. 
These criticisms are understandable. There is certainly a limit to what any theory can 
do—even an attractive one. It cannot make dishonest people honest. It cannot guarantee that 
votes will be counted in accordance with its principles. It cannot promise that the electorate will 
study up on political issues or agree that democratic fairness is more important than religion, 
wealth or power. But it does not follow from any of this that political theories are useless or 
impractical. We may be interested in how to set up a democratic government where no particular 
assumptions are made about the goodness or malevolence of the population or of the outcomes 
of their group decisions. I believe that naturalizing democracy does not require one to assume 
that people are inherently honest and noble rather than deceitful or power-hungry.10 And I will 
 
10 Just as I require no presuppositions according to which “the people” when left to their 
own devices, must be susceptible to Joe McCarthy-type demagogues, neither will I join President 
Andrew Jackson, in holding that “we may have an abiding confidence in the virtue, intelligence 
 
 
argue that taking this tack will help us to answer Nkrumah’s question of why one would ever 
peacefully cede power. In any case, I do not endorse my friend’s pessimism. And I note that 
although a robust democracy tells us what choices we are absolutely required to make only on 
certain quite specific matters, it does not instruct us to hold ourselves above the fray on any 
political issue. It simply necessitates a reordering of priorities.  
The hopelessness expressed to me by my friend will likely produce different reactions 
among different readers. For example, rather than just throw up their hands, some may respond 
to his concerns by saying that while the skepticism is correct with respect to fancy democratic 
rules, it is not that we should do nothing. This group may instead suggest that we expend our 
efforts on teaching “decent values” to various populations. Such respondents may not realize that 
the position they are taking is itself an autocratic or elitist one. By its lights what ought to be 
done in some polity is a strict function of what this group thinks it is right to do. As they believe 
they know what kinds of societal results are just or unjust, perhaps as a result of their religious or 
other moral instruction, they believe they can, like the missionaries of old, simply educate the 
populace to be more like them. A naturalized democracy does not take that route. By its lights 
what would make a society better off is understood in a different, more modest, way that does 
not rely on any view from above regarding just outcomes. 
 
and full capacity for self-government of the great mass of the people, our industrious, honest, 
manly, intelligent, millions of freemen.”(Canovan 1981, 176.) The antipodal caricatures painted 
by those siding with the fearful and disdainful Tocqueville (and Edward Shils) and those who 
agree with the pandering Jackson (and William Jennings Bryan) will both be claimed to be 
largely beside the point. 
 
 
But dropping what is morally good or just brings us back to the “dirty word” problem.11 
It is no secret that the positions of Le Pen, Trump, Johnson, and Bolsonaro have been 
characterized as populists, and consequently been lumped with Mussolini and Hitler. Now, I do 
not deny, e.g., that distilled populism is not inconsistent with the walling off of unwanted 
 
11 One observer who is almost explicit about treating “populism” as a dirty word is Nadia 
Urbinati, although she is somewhat easier on American strains. She removes “Occupy Wall 
Street” from her list of populist groups—exonerates it, really—because, while a “popular 
movement” it has no leader and does not seek to take over the country or convince the current 
leaders to create a more autocratic system. The Tea Party, on the other hand, wins a populist 
designation from Urbinati because of its allegedly dastardly intentions—whether it is quite 
“popular” or not. I mean no criticism of Urbinati here: as will become clear, I not only admire 
her work, but share many of her views regarding representation. But I do not mean by 
“populism” what she does when, following Bobbio, she writes that its “outcome, if actualized, 
would not be an expansion of democracy, but the condensing of the majority opinion under a 
new political class” and goes on to conclude that “Its achievement would be an exit from 
representative and constitutional democracy” (Urbinati 2014, 133-134). Similarly, Jan-Werner 
Muller (2017, 3) calls populism a form of identity politics because, he claims, when its advocates 
are not only necessarily critical of elites, but are also anti-pluralist, in the sense of insisting that 
only populists sympathizers represent the people: “When running for office, populists portray 
their political competitors as part of the immoral, corrupt elite; when ruling, they refuse to 
recognize any opposition as legitimate. The populist logic also implies that whoever does not 
support populist parties might not be a proper part of the people” It will be seen that such “logic” 
is inconsistent with the distillation of populism presented here. 
 
 
minority groups. However, as I hope to show, the sort of democracy espoused herein simply 
cannot engender fascism (properly so-called), and entails a kind of self-adjusting mechanism for 
dealing with border walls. In fact, I will argue that claims of legitimacy for any worthy 
democracy require its absolute prohibition of certain sorts of discriminatory acts within any 
polity. It is equally true that any alliance between populism and traditional liberalism is 
necessarily constrained. But those who think the populism supported here must then be 
“illiberal,” should remember that it is essentially plebiscitary: it leaves no openings either for 
mob rule or mystical identifications between a leader and “his people,” and  it takes no 
demagogue seriously who claims to simply know (without the necessity of polling) what some 
group wants (or what is best for them, whether they want it or not). In fact, a properly arranged 
populism will make it significantly easier to dismiss such “strong men” than it is for traditional 
liberalism to do so. 
 
Distilled Populism 
I am not the first person to attempt to naturalize democratic theory. Perhaps the first to try 
his hand at it was Jeremy Bentham (who, incidentally, may also have played a small role in 
W.V.O. Quine's attempt to naturalize epistemology). Unlike Bentham's utilitarianism, however, 
the naturalized theory proposed here neither relies on hedonism as an explanation of either 
personal or group success, nor attempts any explication at all of what is (morally) good, just, or 
right. But distilled populism does share at least two things with Bentham's approach. First they 
are both attempts to reduce prudential values—what makes individuals and groups better off (if 
not morally better)—to some conception of “the people getting what they want” without 
 
 
reference to any Platonic verities. Second they share a reliance on their own particular 
aggregative methods of determining both group wants and the prudential values they entail.12  
I focus my attention on the United States almost exclusively because while I have 
extensive experience with government in the U.S. style (both in the executive and legislative 
branches in Massachusetts) I am much less qualified to opine on other sorts of governmental 
arrangements. But in spite of the fact that my specific recommendations for changes are limited 
to U.S. constitutions, I believe that the principles of naturalized democratic theory apply 
everywhere.13  
 
12 A more recent approach than Bentham’s that may be seen as an attempt to naturalize 
democratic theory can be found in the (very much non-hedonistic or consequentialist) work of 
John Rawls. As will likely become clear, I do not find Rawls’ work particularly congenial, and, 
although I have great respect for the ambition and scope of his output, it seems to me largely an 
attempt to determine a number of matters I consider undeterminable. In any case, I will not 
discuss it in much detail here. 
13 Naturally, the author of any work making specific proposals of the type scattered 
around this book must acknowledge two facts. First, there is the one so apparently exciting to 
Bentham (1872): “To the whole contents of this proposed code, one all-comprehensive objection 
will not fail to be opposed. In whatever political community, by which it were adopted, it would, 
to a greater or less extent, probably to a very large extent, involve the abolition of the existing 
institutions.” Second, there is the (non-Benthamic) consequence: what value the work has is 
likely destined to more theoretical than practical. 
 
 
So it is the democracy aspect of populism that I focus upon. Margaret Canovan (1981, 
173-174) has suggested that the supposition that populism and democracy are somehow 
separable may seem odd to some observers: 
"Populist democracy" sounds like a pleonasm. Since "democracy" is 
widely supposed to mean "government by the people," how could a 
genuine democracy be other than populist? But this minor linguistic oddity 
conceals an important point: for the ideals and devices of populist 
democracy arise precisely in political contexts where "democracy" in 
some sense is officially accepted as a norm, but where dissidents feel that 
democratic practice does not live up to the promise of the name. Populist 
democracy consists of attempts to realize that promise and to make 
"government by the people" a reality.  
As my position is largely plebiscitary, making the fairness of election mechanisms 
essential to (and nearly sufficient for) the correct determination of what the people want, it must 
depend upon a theory of appropriate voting systems. I will advocate for the combination of two 
specific types of voting schemes: Approval Voting ("AV") and The Single-Non-Transferable 
Vote ("SNTV"). The first is a manner of taking the temperature of an entire district or country-
wide populace. The second provides for minority representation, but does not even suggest what 
the people-as-a-whole want.14 Neither seems to me sufficient on its own. I take appropriate 
 
14 While AV has not been adopted by any significant governmental entity, SNTV has 
been used in several jurisdictions around the world. However, the manner in which I claim it 
 
 
representation of voter interests to require both such mechanisms, as well as a specific manner of 
combining them. Why I think advocacy for the combination of these two methods of aggregating 
the wants of the populace should be considered majoritarian will be discussed in some detail.  
Like nearly everything I have written in the last 35 years, this book has been at least 
partially inspired by the work of Everett Hall, an American philosopher who died in 1960. Hall 
published only one short paper (1943) on the subject matter focused on here, but also left a draft 
of a never-published book that he completed just after World War II. That manuscript, The Road 
to Freedom: An Ethics for Today, is an elaboration of the paper just mentioned.15 Much of that 
work seems to me still relevant, and it has certainly had its effect on the present book.  
While many of the proposals formulated here may seem abstract and/or impracticable, 
I’m happy to note that at least a couple have been recently advocated on Capitol Hill by 
members of Congress and high-level bureaucrats or are currently being pushed by one or more 
active national pressure groups.16 
 
 
must be implemented has never been adopted anywhere (in spite of apt suggestions by several 
American Progressives in the early 20th Century). 
15 As might be surmised from the title, Hall’s book was, at least to a certain extent, 
intended to be a response to Hayek’s Road to Serfdom. I am grateful for the assistance of Aaron 
Lisec at the Everett Hall Archives at the University of Southern Illinois and for the permission 
granted me by Everett’s son, Dr. Richard Hall, to quote from his father’s manuscript. 
16 I’m thinking here of Barbara Boxer, John Dingell, Jamie Raskin, Nicholas Johnson, 
Elizabeth Warren, Pete Buttigieg, The Brennan Center for Justice, National Youth Rights 
Association, and The Center for Election Science.  
 
 
Plan of the Book and Acknowledgements 
 
The plan of the book is as follows: Chapter One focuses on what “democracy” means, 
notes several paradoxes that come up when we think about it, and considers whether it is the case 
that there is need for democratic reform in the U.S. Chapters Two and Three set forth what I call 
Choice Voluntarism (or “CHOICE”), a new, though Hallian, theory of prudential value 
according to which both individual and social valuations are of items that are human-created but 
nevertheless objective. These chapters present the fundamental arguments for naturalizing 
democracy and for moving to a particular way of utilizing a principle that we could follow Hall 
1943 by designating “The More Good, the Better.” These chapters are, in places, somewhat more 
technical than the others, since they engage in detail with the contemporary literature on 
prudential value. Those who dislike analytic philosophy may wish to skip them, but this can be 
done without loss only if it is understood that their main conclusions, which involve the assertion 
that what makes the world better for people is a function of the quantity and scope of successful 
free choosings, are essential to my case for distilled populism.  
Chapter Four is a discussion of the thorny issues surrounding the equality of persons and 
their votes, and of whether the equality of one necessarily implies the inequality of the other. I 
argue that acceptance of the CHOICE standard discussed in the two prior chapters leads to an 
understanding of how both votes and voters may be considered equal, without contradiction.  
Chapters Five and Six center on what are sometimes called the boundary issues of 
democratic theory. Once it is decided that each person is to get a vote with a weight equal to 
everyone else’s, we now need to figure out just who these persons are that are to be enfranchised. 
Chapter Five focuses on whether it is affected interests or geographical placement that is most 
 
 
relevant to the issuance of group voting rights and eventually argues for the latter. Chapter Six 
urges the reduction of the minimum voting age to 16 and the enfranchisement of “permanent 
residents”–including those who may be incarcerated and those having what some would consider 
only the slightest “competency.”  
The following two chapters are largely devoted to voting mechanisms. Chapter Seven 
urges support for Approval Voting, an age-old system that was reintroduced and popularized in 
the 20th Century (mainly by Brams and Fishburn 2007 in their eponymous book on the subject). 
AV is claimed to have significant advantages over other electoral systems, including that of 
having a method for addressing the “problem of intensity,” something which has been claimed to 
fatally infect all populist majoritarian theories. Chapter Eight advocates a particular sort of 
implementation of the Single Non-Transferable Ballot. It is argued that SNTV, would best 
provide (sizeable) minorities with proportionate voice, and, if appropriately combined with AV 
would produce a democracy that is both majoritarian and protective of minority political rights. 
In Chapters Seven and Eight, I also consider “majority cycles,” the appropriate size of 
legislatures, the concept of fair apportionment, and what it means to be “majoritarian.”  
In Chapters Nine through Twelve, I turn more particularly to U.S. governmental 
structures and procedures, sometimes offering quite specific recommendations for change.17 
Chapter Nine focuses more closely on nature of both votes and the act of voting and consider 
what these should suggest to us about appropriate levels of “directness” in worthy democracies. 
The classic question of whether representatives should be considered delegates or trustees is 
 
17 Those interested in comparative government or critical theory may be disappointed at 
this American tilt, but I hope many of the arguments and morals found here will be amenable to 
translation. 
 
 
there taken up. I also discuss the necessity of referendum, recall, and reversal provisions, and 
attempt to set forth their limitations. 
Chapter Ten continues the discussion of representation, focusing on the value of 
deliberation within law-making assemblies and the appropriate mechanisms for making laws. It 
is contended there that “separation of powers” has been taken much too far in the U.S. and that 
bicamerality is one of the main defects that emerged from the “great compromise” that created 
the U.S. in 1787. 
Chapter Eleven makes the case that our Constitution is both too much and too little. By 
that I mean that it both contains various provisions that are not really fundamental and would 
thus be more appropriate for statutory law (if the people really want them), and also fails to 
contain a number of provisions needed to completely protect certain rights that must be exalted 
in any democracy—the political ones. For example, The Fairness [in broadcasting] Doctrine, 
something which largely disappeared during the Reagan Administration, is claimed in this 
chapter to be a fitting Constitutional solution to current campaign issues—and something that 
may be especially important subsequent to the Citizen’s United decision. Because populism is 
skeptical of a number of “rights” countenanced by other theories, it is seen by some to be a sure 
harbinger of dystopia. So, I consider two science-fiction scenarios involving genocide to help see 
where the populistic conception of rights would land us. I also talk about the approach 
naturalized democracy would take toward the real-world “pro-choice”/”pro-life” debate, and 
concede the theory’s limited capacity to create concord there. 
Chapter Twelve provides responses to several objections to democracy recently brought 
by libertarians and others. Some of these critiques are based on the belief that the only value that 
can be claimed for democratic processes must be found in the outcomes of those processes. 
Others allege different sorts of defects that I claim are related to an incorrect, epistemic construal 
 
 
of voting. I attempt to show the extent to which all of the objections would be friendly to elite 
“guardians” being in charge of our country. I argue that Platonic, guardian-friendly theories are 
inconsistent with both popular sovereignty and any coherent derivation of “rights,” and conclude 
by indicating the extent to which naturalized democracy produces a more positive, less fearful 
view of government than the conception espoused by Alexander Hamilton and his fellow 
Founders. 
I am grateful to Richard Hall, Joanne Kaliontzis, Aaron Lisec, Larry Tapper, Kevin 
Zollman, Caleb Huntington, Steve D’Amato, Greg Dennis, Aaron Hamlin, Alan Linov, Carol 
Calliotte, John DeMouy, Bruce Switzer and several anonymous contributors to The Skeptical 
Zone website for helpful comments, expertise, encouragement, etc. Chapters Two and Three are 
essentially revisions (some substantial) of a paper appearing in Philosophia (Horn, 2019). I am 
grateful for permission to reproduce that material here. But my deepest appreciation goes to the 
wonderful Carol, the amazing Emma and Chloe, and the extremely soft Dumbledore for putting 
up with their cantankerous husband, father, and favorite lap provider (respectively), throughout 
his long and mostly solitary struggle to understand what makes something a worthy democracy. 
They’re the best. 
  
 
 
Chapter One 
 
Introduction: Axioms, Paradoxes, and Alleged Deficits of Democracy 
There is a lot of talk these days about the way the U.S. Electoral College works…or fails 
to work. Those who supported Al Gore or Hillary Clinton in their Presidential campaigns 
complain that it was anti-democratic for that system to prevent the victory of candidates who had 
received more votes. Similar arguments are brought against the requirement that each state in the 
U.S. gets exactly two Senators—regardless of the population of the state. These two features of 
the U.S. Constitution seem explicitly designed to prevent the majority from getting what it 
wants. Naturally, it is currently Democrats who are most vocal about this. For if the more 
populous states had more Senators, there would seem to be much greater likelihood of enactment 
of policies now favored by Democrats. Similar grievances are brought against the Supreme Court 
of the United States (hereafter “SCOTUS”). “Why,” it is asked, “should nine unelected 
individuals who may serve until they die get to decide whether people may carry automatic 
weapons or receive abortions in their third trimesters? Shouldn’t it matter what large majorities 
of the citizenry want? Isn’t that what democracy requires?” 
Of course, not everyone would see additional democratic features as unvarnished 
governmental goods. Many Americans may be tired of reminding their more “progressive” 
friends of the many illiberal democracies around the world where governments seem to have no 
scruples about nationalizing hard-earned private property or throwing people in prison for 
expressing their opinions in public. “Sure, the majority may have elected these thugs,” you may 
wish to tell them, “but that doesn’t make their actions acceptable. The very idea that some 
 
 
governmental act is appropriate just because it was arrived it by democratic means is ridiculous! 
Have you never heard of the tyranny of the majority?” 
Four Political Dimensions 
While many on the “right” today are likely to claim that any alleged anti-democratic 
elements in the U.S. Constitution are features rather than bugs, it is important to recognize that 
aligning the “left” with democratic tendencies and the “right” with-anti-democratic or libertarian 
thinking doesn’t always work. It has not always been America’s “left” that has clamored for 
more democracy and objected to what was considered a usurpation of the power of the people by 
some empowered minority.” There have also been numerous instances in which conservative 
members of Congress have chafed at the failures of clear majorities in their states to get their 
way. For while “progressives” have pushed for abolition of slavery or for increased regulation of 
the economy based on claimed majority preferences, the same sorts of arguments have also been 
brought by those wanting to preserve some “state’s right” to retain slavery or to ignore a Federal 
regulation considered too harsh. On both sides, there have been appeals to the fact that the 
majority of some jurisdiction’s voters (if not always of all of its residents) want this or that. At 
present, “left” appeals to various "human rights”—say to universal health care, a “living wage” 
or transgender bathrooms—are claimed to trump the will of majorities in various jurisdictions, 
and where this the case, it is generally “conservatives” who may clamor for more democracy. 
But, again, we see the opposite dynamic when the “right to life” is somewhere opposed to 
majority support for “a woman’s right to choose.” 
Thus, it is normal to wonder if there are reasons that can be adduced for majority rule that 
are entirely independent of the results expected to be produced by it. We may just want to know 
generally whether it makes sense to support democracy even in those cases where we believe the 
 
 
majority is evil, stupid, uninformed, or uninterested. It is easy to find both affirmative and 
negative answers to these questions in the existing literature on this subject. Indeed, countless 
books on political theory have been devoted to this subject since Plato wrote The Republic in 
about 380 BC. But the innumerable discussions of vote aggregation, “epistocracy,”18 natural 
rights, deliberation, participation, decision theory, general will, sovereignty, consensus, and 
polyarchy have largely managed to miss something that seems to me central. And this has been 
the case regardless of how brilliant those works have otherwise been. Anti-democrats, from Plato 
to John Adams, Edmund Burke, Voltaire, Joseph Schumpeter, Ayn Rand, Robert Nozick, 
William Riker and Jason Brennan have scoffed at the very idea that “the ignorant mob” ought to 
be asked much more than whether the current bums should be kicked out (if even that!). While 
others, like John Lilburne, Tom Paine, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Herbert Croly, Theodore 
Roosevelt, Jürgen Habermas, Robert Dahl, Amy Gutmann, and Gerry Mackie, have insisted that 
the “general will” must be consulted before governmental actions can be authorized. With all 
these first-rate minds dissecting these topics from nearly every conceivable angle, what could 
possibly have been missed? 
To answer this, we must consider the nature of the disagreement. Is it that there are 
different conceptions of what a utopian society would consist in? Perhaps those who want more 
democracy and those who either want less or think the present level is fine simply have different 
visions of Eden. Couldn’t that make it quite natural for them to disagree on the means—
democratic or otherwise—for reaching their great societies? I think not. “Result-assessment” 
cannot be a sensible reason for supporting different levels of democracy because, as we have 
seen, there is nothing like unanimity of goals either among the democracy-doubters on the left or 
 
18 Rule by the knowledgeable or wise. 
 
 
the right,19 or among the democracy exponents to be found there. Consider a continuum moving 
from (A) antipathy to all governmental limitations on what citizens may or may not do on one 
end, to (Z) support for extreme governmental autocracy on the other. We may find at the “don’t 
tread on me” (A) end such unlikely partners as left-wing communitarian anarchists and right-
wing evangelical decentralists. While at the “it’s good to do as the wise instruct” (Z) extremity, 
there will be a wide variety of different sorts of utopians: a collection including both those 
advocating the mandatory use of Skinner boxes and those who would require conformance to 
Sharia Law. The communitarians and the Skinnerians, are thus at opposite ends of the autocracy 
continuum in spite of both arguably being “far left” (say, because of their support for high levels 
of “mandatory sharing”) on the political spectrum. Similarly, Sharia Law proponents and devout 
Calvinist decentralists may, from one point of view, be said to take like political stances because 
they are both on the (perhaps theocratic) “right” on several issues, in spite of their likely 
differences regarding what they think are appropriate governmental powers. Paradoxically, 
libertarians may find themselves closer to the autocrats on this autonomy dimension than to those 
anarchists who may seem to them to be no better than the beast worshippers in Lord of the Flies. 
That is because libertarians are often quite insistent on the strict constraints they believe must be 
placed on any “infringements of essential freedoms.” It should thus be evident that there is no 
easily derivable relation between the progressivism/conservatism dimension and the 
 
19 It is notoriously difficult to get a consensus understanding of the left—right spectrum, 
and nothing particularly rides on agreement with my own conception, but the general idea should 
be clear: average members of the Democratic Party are currently to the left of average 
Republicans; doctrinaire theocrats are to the right of average Republicans; strict Marxists are to 
the left of average Democrats, etc. 
 
 
autonomy/autocracy dimension. The fact that median members of the large U.S. political parties 
may be found somewhere in the middle of both ranges should not suggest that the two 
dimensions are identical. 
But there is another complication that should be added here. Both liberals and 
conservatives have argued for many years about whether personal goals should or should not be 
left entirely up to individuals. We have already seen that, for their part, small “d” democrats may 
be liberals, conservatives, centrists, socialists, anarchists, or states’ rights nativists. But there is 
an additional difference of opinion that can be found among these groups regarding whether 
there are obligatory personal goals, like, e.g., caring for one’s children or service to Allah. In 
other words, we can zoom in on members of the various groups mentioned above, wherever they 
may be found on the autocracy or left-right dimensions, and ask whether they believe that the 
personal goals they have chosen—whether these involve improved video game skills, 
memorization of Hamlet, amply providing for one’s family, increasing one’s number of sexual 
conquests, or decreasing world-wide carbon emissions—ought to be left entirely up to them. 
Thus, we have a third Dimension, this one specifying what might be called “the latitudinarian 
scale.” Here, we are likely to find the libertarian at the highly latitudinarian end and the 
theocrats, Skinnerians, and communists on the other, dogmatic end. This dimension should not 
be confused with that involving autonomy/autocracy, because nothing prevents a latitudinarian 
on the personal level from being entirely pro-autocracy on the group level. A libertarian, for 
example, might have extreme distaste for the idea that her personal goals may be set by anyone 
else—even the wisest guardian—but may feel that a benevolent, powerful dictator is the best 
way to produce the latitudinarian regime she desires. Thus, all of our three dimensions seem to 
be orthogonal with respect to one another.  
 
 
These three continua (left/right, autonomic/autocratic, and latitudinarian/dogmatic) have 
been the focus of discussion by moralists, political theorists and economists for hundreds of 
years, and these thinkers have burrowed more and more deeply into all that might be connected 
with the question of what constitutes the good life. The puzzles they’ve wrestled with are 
familiar: “Must desirable societies encourage goodness and frown on evil activities?” “Is the 
enjoyment of push-pin of less value than the enjoyment of poetry?” “How much of what we have 
should we share with the needy?” The answers given to such inquiries—both as to appropriate 
goals, and as to appropriate methods of obtaining them—are what primarily divide people into 
different political groups. For example, a classical liberal of the dogmatic variety, safe in her 
assurance that all people must be protected in their persons and property, may work out the 
details of what else (if anything) might be required to bring about heaven on earth; while a more 
community-minded person might concentrate on how far worker control of industry or protection 
of indigenous customs must be pressed to ensure a good society. Just as the classical liberal has 
somehow determined that freedom and security must be protected at all costs, the communitarian 
has come to what she takes to be a reasoned conclusion that, in a decent society, corporate greed 
cannot be allowed to result in the exploitation of children, gays, or the rainforest. These opposed 
groups often confront each other, sometimes to argue, sometimes to compromise, sometimes to 
protest; and over time a pendulum seems to swing back and forth between the traction gained by 
moderate and extreme views. The heroes of each group—scholars, novelists, saints, politicians, 
theologians—have provided copious arguments for every position on all the continua: from 
Chomskyan anarcho-syndicalism or Randian libertarianism to Marxian socialism, Amish 
primitivism, and Skinnerian utopianism.  
When thinking about democracy, it is crucial to notice that the dimension stretching from 
perfectly distilled populism on one end to no-popular-control on the other, is not identical with 
 
 
any of the three dimensions discussed above—not even with the one stretching between (A) and 
(Z). On one end of the populism continuum, we will find people getting from their governments 
what and only what they want—whatever it might be; and at the other extreme we might find 
totalitarianism. But at that undemocratic terminus we also might find utter anarchy, 
constitutional libertarianism, theocracy, scientistic paternalism, or, paradoxically, even certain 
types of town-meeting-style communitarianism. Any arrangement that either systematically 
ignores the desires of the majority in favor of anything thought to be superior to that goal is 
essentially anti-democratic, whatever else it might be. The main feature of the populist 
perspective is its extreme resistance to every claim regarding what constitutes social good except 
for one: group self-governance. No other ostensible societal good is deemed fundamental by the 
distilled populist. 
Seven Populist Complaints About the U.S. With Madisonian Responses 
It cannot be denied that the current situation is one of stalemate all across the board. It 
would therefore be pointless for me to take my own attitudes regarding what I take to be a 
shortage of democracy in the U.S. today as being likely to carry much weight with anyone else. 
To illustrate this, consider the ease with which a Madisonian (i.e., someone who mainly worries 
about the tyranny of the rapacious mob) can respond to a number of concerns that a populist 
might bring up about the present state of American government. 
1. Something seems wrong about (e.g., Presidential) elections in which a candidate 
receiving fewer votes than one of his/her opponents nevertheless wins the race.  
A “The Great Compromise” whereby the several states agreed to enter the 
union only under certain conditions is a feature of our freedom. Our Constitutional 
 
 
system is precisely what allows for protection of individual rights against a tyrannical 
majority which—if there were too much democracy—could crush every minority group.  
2. Something seems wrong about a small handful of unelected “Supreme” jurists being 
able to overturn the evident will of a large majority—especially if such jurists cannot 
be removed by the citizenry based on the substance of their decisions.  
A. It is precisely this sort of judicial review that makes the U.S. a jurisdiction of 
“laws, not men.” Justice Marshall understood that something had to be the last 
word on what the government may and may not do, and he made sure it was 
our Constitution.  
3. Something seems wrong about the incredible influence of wealth in electoral politics. 
Doesn’t a system that allows this violate some important principle of the equality 
political power among citizens?  
A. Shouldn’t a guaranteed right to free speech, assembly, and association mean 
that no public entity may curtail anyone’s right to unrestricted political 
activities? Only the right to unlimited use of money to advocate for particular 
candidates or issues can guarantee political freedom. Any limitation would be 
pure despotism.  
4. Something seems wrong with a system that allows legislators to fail to enact laws that 
majorities want and provide no recourse to citizens until some subsequent election. 
A. Wouldn’t systems allowing for the recall of authority figures or reversal of 
their actions simply make it impossible to govern? Shouldn’t we insist that 
representation is not reduced to mere delegation so that capable, experienced 
office-holders may actually govern and not just take orders?  
 
 
5. Something seems wrong about a system that provides majorities not only with 100% 
of ‘rule’ but with 100% of representation. 
A. Proposals for proportional representation or “fair voting” schemes are really 
just hobby horses. There are an infinite number of such proposals and all are 
inconsistent with each other. It is only simple, understandable federal systems, 
like the one the Founders gave us that can be depended upon to ensure that 
minorities will have their fair say in government. 
6. Something seems wrong when high school students who want additional gun controls 
(because so many of them are being shot in school) are given no right to vote on a 
matter that affects them so greatly. 
A. Obviously, children are insufficiently mature to vote—and what’s more, they 
don’t pay taxes. They are free to agitate on the matter (as they have), and their 
parents can certainly be expected to represent their interests. That is sufficient. 
7. Something seems wrong about strange, result-oriented district shapes that are 
constructed precisely for the purpose of preventing fair representation. 
A. Shouldn’t states be allowed the latitude to do what their voters want? In any 
case, all forms of voting have been determined by the most important thinkers 
on this subject (from Condorcet to Arrow and Riker) to be riddled with 
paradoxes and contradictions. So, singling out gerrymanders is just political 
posturing. 
I think this little colloquy between two discussants, one an advocate for additional 
democracy and the other a Madisonian supporter of republican constraints, provides a good 
illustration of the difficulties that must be faced by any theorist arguing for additional “people 
 
 
power.” And consider how much more demanding this task would be if all the other theorists—
the socialists, the theocrats, the anarchists and libertarians—also had their chances to respond to 
the seven populist complaints listed above! Why should any theory be given precedence? Can 
the populist seriously suggest that every position but hers is mistaken? That apparently arrogant 
standpoint is precisely the position of this book. As indicated above, I do think something has 
generally been missed or mistaken in discussions of these matters. And I believe that puzzle 
piece is the key to understanding which of the many voices on democracy should be heeded. The 
burden of this book will be to make a plausible case for this admittedly audacious claim. 
It will help to see the case I am required to make here if we shift to another manner of 
looking at the panoply of political positions. The list below separates democratic theories 
according to their consistency with one or another of the following mutually exclusive and 
ostensibly exhaustive propositions: 
(1) The proper goals of both persons and societies are objective items/truths that are 
either generally known or can be determined by religious, philosophical, or empirical 
investigations.  
(2) The proper goals of both persons and society are objective items/truths that are not 
generally known, but may, on the societal level, be discovered by democratic means, since 
elections are “truth-tracking” activities: they provide evidence that this or that goal is the right 
one.  
(3) The proper goals of both persons and societies are objective items/truths that are not 
generally known, and democratic procedures cannot help us discover them on the societal level, 
since elections are not truth-tracking.  
(4) There are no “proper goals” of any society, because societies, like the individuals 
within them, have only subjective ends. But what the subjective goals happen to be within any 
 
 
society may be discovered on the societal level by democratic means, since elections are truth-
tracking in the sense of helping us find the subjective ends actually subscribed to by the 
populace.  
(5) There are no “proper goals” of any society, because societies, like the individuals 
within them, have only subjective ends. What the subjective goals happen to be within any 
society cannot be discovered by democratic means on the societal level since elections are not 
truth-tracking.20 
It is thus clear that, in light of the large number of competing theories regarding the 
nature of social goals and choices, on the theoretical level, the populist has a lot of work to do if 
anyone is to be convinced. In addition, there are empirical contentions requiring response. 
Populists must deal with the fact that anti-democrats may be able to produce numerous historical 
cases in support of their claim that significant reductions in governmental checks to democratic 
urges are quite likely to produce unpleasant results. Several ostensibly populist regimes (that 
 
20 Obviously, a similar assortment of views can be taken toward the “proper” (or most 
efficient) methods for reaching the goals specified in this list. These means may be thought to be 
objective truths that either can or cannot themselves be discovered through democratic 
procedures or they may be thought to be entirely subjective items that may or may not be found 
through elections or other participatory activities. And as one could take one view about the 
subjectivity/objectivity of the “proper goals” (and whether and how they may be discovered) and 
a different view about the subjectivity/objectivity of the “proper means” (and whether and how 
those might be discovered), the number of positional possibilities here could be significantly 
enlarged. It is also possible to hold that while individuals may have proper goals, societies do 
not, or vice versa. 
 
 
which immediately followed the French Revolution is a favorite example) seem to bear out the 
fear that terror necessarily follows upon radical democracy. And it may well be that if we look to 
what has happened in the most democratic jurisdictions throughout history, we will find 
instability, extensive corruption, even beheadings and genocide. Who will want to defend that 
heritage? Although it is true that the autocracy camp has equally horrible precedents to explain, 
perhaps those can be attributed to insufficient protection of “natural rights” or to the fact that the 
wrong goals were sought or experts put in charge. It seems more difficult for the populist to reply 
that if there had only been more democracy in place, there would surely have been reduced 
guillotine use. And if the populist tries to make apparently democratic tyrannies a function of 
insufficient education among the democratic electorate, the response will surely be, “Well, then, 
we must presume that those electorates were not actually supportive of additional education, 
since they were democracies and could have done exactly what they wanted in that area too!” 
The moral seems to be that shifting the focus from philosophical arguments to empirical 
outcomes may not be too helpful to the populism advocate.  
Returning to the theoretical side, it seems undeniable that societal goals must be either 
objective or subjective and that democratic procedures must be either conducive to the discovery 
of truths or not. What other possibilities could there be? Again, I will argue that the set of (1)-(5) 
is importantly misleading and incomplete. Obviously, that is a claim that requires ample support, 
and fulfilling that requirement is one of the principal tasks to be undertaken here. 
But before we turn to what having and discovering goals consists in on personal and 
societal levels—the main topic of the book—it may be well to think about whether there is much 
point to this inquiry at all, whatever the right answers to those questions may be. For there is a 
Panglossian line of objections according to which there is nothing to worry or complain about 
with respect to the current level of democracy in the U.S. because it is perfect right now. Of 
 
 
course, if what we have in the U.S. today is no less than the paradigm for which all democratic 
entities reach, there can hardly be any point to a lengthy inquiry into the nature of democratic 
procedures. Perhaps the list of supposed democratic shortages in the U.S just reflects a bunch of 
characteristics that only some impossibly flawless and ideal democracy could exemplify. 
According to that objection, the fact that I (in common with “free speech warriors,” “identity-
mongering” deliberation advocates, and other allegedly utopian theorists) wish for something 
different does not mean there actually could be anything more democratic than what we have 
now. 
That is a pretty line, no doubt, but it seems clearly false. If “democracy” means anything 
at all, it must mean doing what the people want, and, for good or ill, that standard can hardly be 
said to be met in the U.S. at present. Our system may indeed be better than many others in a 
large variety of ways, but solid contemporary research (Gilens and Page 2014, 564) demonstrates 
conclusively that “average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent 
influence” on the policies taken by our government. That extensive study demonstrates that, in 
reality, for over a decade, corporate interests, rich individuals, and powerful interest groups have, 
through monetary contributions and effective lobbying, been the prime movers of American 
policy. The desires of average citizens have been largely irrelevant. One may argue, of course, 
that these results have been good for the country, or even that they’ve made it better than any 
possible alternatives could have. But that would not make these practices democratic. We may 
even engage in a sort of “reflective equilibrium” (Rawls 1971) by revising our original definition 
of “democracy” in consideration of actual (arguably paradigmatic) practices we find around the 
world currently, or can find in historical records. Such a move would not help very much with 
respect to the U.S. system. For the reasons given, the U.S. simply cannot pass muster as a polity 
in which the people rule. When one finds oneself insisting that practices that allow nine 
 
 
unremovable individuals to have the final say in what shall be the laws of a country of 350 
million are definitory of the concept of democracy, one is no longer making sense: and it does 
not matter whether those practices are or are not beneficial to those millions.  
The above list of seven claimed democracy shortages in the U.S. may be useful in 
helping us to unearth the basic meaning of the term, for it is the concept of democracy that 
causes the disquieting impression that “something is wrong” with this or that present 
policymaking procedure. I believe that, as a first approximation, we can assert that these 
discomforts stem from apparent inconsistencies with one or another of two propositions. We 
might even dub those propositions axioms. 
Two Axioms of Democratic Theory 
(A) A democratic polity must at least try to do what its citizens indicate that they want 
done: there is no “higher authority” to which one may appeal for better or more 
legitimate instructions regarding what must be done. 
(B) Each citizen in a democracy must be treated equally when it comes to the 
determination of what its citizens want their government to do.21 
One may again resist these as ideal formulations, and insist that one is better off defining 
“democracy” extensionally by providing a list of polities one believes ought to be considered 
democracies or have been so described in political histories. If we proceed in that (arguably 
question-begging) manner, and the U.S. is among the examples on the list, it will, by definition, 
 
21 As we shall see in Chapters Five and Six, the use of “citizen” here is somewhat 
misleading. 
 
 
be an example of a democratic state in spite of falling afoul of what seems to be expressed by 
(A) and (B) above. To repeat, however, that approach is inappropriate because those two axioms 
seem to provide a fairly orthodox take on what it means to be a democratic institution. After all, 
there is nothing about the concept of democracy that requires that there has ever been a perfect—
or even particularly good—one. What we do know, is that any such entities must be ultimately 
controlled by their members—or at least by a majority of them. Why? Because it is essential to 
the concept that, in a democracy, the supreme power—the sovereignty—is vested in the people at 
large: it cannot have been turned over even to a subset of them. A citizenry may exercise this 
authority either directly or indirectly through elected representatives, but if that authority is 
entirely alienated by its complete conveyance to anything else—whether person, group or 
deity—democracy is no more. It must be the people rather than the kings, the oracles, or the 
riches that decide what public actions will take place. It will therefore not do to take every 
country whose name has ever been found within some list of ostensibly democratic states, and 
say “these and anything like them should be considered democracies just because their names are 
on this list.” 
While it cannot be sensibly doubted that there are serious deficiencies to be found in the 
current state of democracy in the U.S., it does not follow that such alleged shortcomings have not 
been good for the country. But we should at least be willing to agree with this sentiment found in 
J. Allen Smith (1907): 
It is [the] conservative approval of the Constitution under the guise of 
sympathy with majority rule, which has perhaps more than anything else 
misled the people as to the real spirit and purpose of that instrument. It 
was by constantly representing it as the indispensable means of attaining 
 
 
the ends of democracy, that it came to be so generally regarded as the 
source of all that is democratic in our system of government. 
I will argue that it is not a good thing for a country to lack real democracy, and it is my 
hope that this book will aid in discovering some possible means of improvement. What I cannot 
provide, however, is a happy prognosis: for my medicines, like Bentham’s, “would, to a greater 
or less extent, probably to a very large extent, involve the abolition of the existing institutions.” I 
don’t call for such abolition here (though I may wish for it occasionally): I simply say that 
without significant changes that may depend on the abolition of this or that system or practice 
and its replacement by something else, the U.S. cannot justly be called a democratic regime. And 
I hope to show that being a good democracy is something to which we should aspire. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, (A) and (B) are much trickier than they may appear at first 
glance. A correct understanding of them could be claimed to depend on which proposition we 
pick from our (1)-(5) list above. For example, a good deal of the literature on democratic theory 
has focused on whether or not what citizens want in axiom (A) should be thought to be a 
function of enlightened consideration of such matters as the effects a course of action is likely to 
have on everyone, and so depend upon our conceptions of justice. Further, theorists have 
struggled even to answer questions regarding just which individuals should be taken to be the 
citizens in (B): Is anyone who stops by for a visit qualified as a relevant person, or must one pay 
taxes or own real estate where their wishes are to count? And what about the desires of the 
clearly insane or those of convicted felons? What of children or even newborn babies? Must their 
wishes also be included in the mix? If so, why should we consider it to be definitory of 
“democracy” that the vote of a young child be given equal weight with that of a Constitutional 
Scholar? As can be seen, our axioms might be few in number, but they are far from simple. 
 
 
Let me repeat here that even if we were to sort out this matter of what “democracy” (or 
“good democracy or “worthy democracy” or “populist democracy”) calls for, that would not 
have gotten us anywhere near the point where we could claim that having such a system is 
beneficial or that getting closer to it in the U.S. would be good for U.S. citizens. At present we 
are only considering what democracy is. Obviously, justice cannot be done to any of these 
matters in this introductory chapter. But I can at least provide a sense of what is to come in the 
sequel. As a first illustration, let us consider for a moment some of the thorny problems 
surrounding (B) 
 
Liberalism, Republicanism, Nativism, and Citizenship 
 
In an insightful article that is essential reading for those interested in U.S. attitudes 
toward inclusivity and exclusivity since its founding, Rogers M. Smith 1988 distinguishes three 
basic attitudes: Liberalism, Republicanism, and Ethnocultural Americanism. As Smith explains, 
the Liberal outlook, taking all (property-owning white) males to be created equal, was the most 
inclusive of the three creeds. On that view, one is born with inalienable rights, and among them 
is being eligible to have one’s votes counted upon reaching (male, white) adulthood—although, 
perhaps one might also be required to have a mite of freehold property to show sincerity and 
ability. Smith’s point is that, for Liberals during the Colonial days, white, male adults were 
essentially indistinguishable “from the inside,” so it seemed there could be no insurmountable 
bars to anyone’s citizenship. One might need to reside somewhere for some period of time or 
show one’s seriousness by the acquisition of real estate, but other characteristics, such as those 
involving language, culture, education, or the like, were considered incidental. If they don’t 
 
 
matter to God—show up “under the hood” as it were—they should not bother registrars of 
voters. 
As Smith sees it, a second strain, which he calls Republican, has been more goal-
oriented. Rather than taking citizenship privileges to be implied by natural rights, these colonial 
Republicans focused on what they took to be characteristics likely to promote the common good 
through self-governance. Since a homogeneous citizenry was seen by these Republicans as 
essential to the avoidance of intractable controversies, what Liberals had taken to be 
unimportant, accidental characteristics, were viewed by the Republicans as essential to the 
welding together of a functioning community.  
This strain of communitarianism was taken a step further by Ethnoculturalists, who 
believed (and may still believe) that even homogeneity is insufficient to produce a decent 
society. On their view, “sameness at the core” is not enough: some races or genders are simply 
less competent. Indeed, even cultural and ethnic characteristics are thought to make crucial 
differences. On the more nativist strains of this position, only homogeneous groups of “real 
Americans” can be expected to produce a competent, limited government in the people’s interest. 
Smith (1988, 233) writes, 
In the Jacksonian years, the scientific racialism of the "American school of 
ethnography" and the cultural nationalism of the European romantics gave 
these ideas intellectual credibility. They were subsequently reinforced by 
the racialist anthropology, history, and Social Darwinist sociology and 
political science influential in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
 
 
centuries. Publicists, professors and politicians worked these ideas into a 
general "political ideology" of "American racial Anglo-Saxonism.22 
So, who are “the people”? Is it simply whoever the laws apply to? Such an answer is 
suggested by the American colonist chant “No taxation without representation!” But analogous 
slogans could currently be shouted by long-time, non-citizen residents who must comply with 
numerous statutes—including tax laws—over which they have no say. And what was urged by 
women and African-Americans in the not so distant past is sometimes heard today from 
advocates not only for resident aliens, but for minors or felons. After all, those groups are also 
subject to the laws of the land. But, of course, it is equally true that various statutes apply to 
toddlers, babies, even pets! At what point does agitation for suffrage simply become ridiculous?  
These issues are not new. Indeed, not only the Federal government, but every state has 
regularly had to take them up since voting rules were first established among them. Are there any 
general principles we can now turn to for resolving these questions, or are we forced to take them 
on a case-by-case basis and acknowledge, in light of the widely different answers and 
approaches adopted throughout the country since Colonial days, that there are no such principles 
to be found? These matters will be taken up in Chapters Five and Six. 
 
From Who May Vote to What May be Voted Upon 
 
22 Perhaps when we consider The Emancipation Proclamation, women’s suffrage and The 
Voting Rights Act of 1964, it will seem that these issues have sorted themselves out through a 
steady increase of Liberalism and an increasing disdain for Nativism. But the renewed focus on 
and fear of immigrant crimes and “caravans of dangerous hordes” certainly suggest otherwise. 
 
 
 
Turning now to Axiom (A) above, we will find that a number of “chicken-egg” issues 
pop up whenever one considers problems of democracy. For example, it is well known both that 
a large percentage of eligible voters fail to cast votes in U.S. elections and that many of those 
who do vote have little knowledge of the issues or people they are voting for. Suppose both of 
those assertions are correct. We might infer that voting is unimportant to a vast number of 
citizens, and that this is just as well, because American voters are ill-equipped to be involved in 
governance. But it might also be thought that the apparent disinterest is no more than a result of 
the way our system is set up. That is, some might say that in our large, winner-take-all elections 
there is no real reason for people to learn about the issues or even to care about voting at all. If I 
believe that my vote can’t change anything, or if I don’t like any of the candidates, or understand 
that after I vote elected officials will do whatever they want anyhow, there’s a good chance that I 
won’t bother to study the issues at hand or even make my way to a polling booth. The evidence 
suggests that a feeling of pointlessness is not unreasonable. The study by Gilens and Page (2014) 
mentioned above looked at about 1800 policy positions considered by Congress between 1981 
and 2002, and found that the views of the majority of Americans on those issues were largely 
ignored in favor of the views espoused by powerful (mostly corporate) lobbyists. The recourse 
for that, of course, would seem to be to “throw the bums out” at the first opportunity, but not 
only may there be no election on the horizon, those same corporate interests may be very 
effective in preventing any bum-throwing. Thus, it seems reasonable to wonder whether the 
voters are to blame for their indifference or the system is to blame for making voters largely 
irrelevant. The more indifferent voters are, the more irrelevant they are bound to become, and the 
more irrelevant voters are, the more indifferent they are bound to become. So…chicken or egg? 
 
 
Even if we stipulate that there are problems with the current system and ignore any 
concern that we would not be able to implement improvements even if we could find them, it is 
difficult to see how to progress. Chicken-egg problems seem to arise at every turn. As we have 
said in reference to (B) above, democracies require knowing the will of the people, since in self-
governed jurisdictions the citizenry must always make the final determination on matters of 
public policy. But if we are to take the pulse of “the people,” we need to know who they are—
who to ask. Like the old joke regarding one who has lost her glasses being unable to look for 
them until she finds them, it seems that “the people” must be asked in order for us to discover 
just who “the people” are!  
Democratic paradoxes extend beyond who may vote to what may be voted on, whether 
there are items of law that must be placed beyond the voters’ reach. Such limitations may be 
expected to be found in Constitutions, particularly sections designated as “bills of rights.” Smith 
(1988, 230) notes that “Enlightenment liberalism's ‘natural’ rights were fairly minimal: they did 
not include rights to any specific political membership, much less enfranchisement.” But it is 
worth noting that, even if such provisions had been included, the limitation of “rights” to 
guarantees of protection against governmental incursions means that those provisions would not 
have been able to go terribly far in ensuring government by the people. Suppose, for example, 
that businesses began to offer desperately-needed jobs only to those who would give up their 
right to vote. A constitution limited to protecting citizens against government actions could do 
nothing to stop that practice. In this way, even an ostensibly “democratic” constitution 
guaranteeing the political rights of free speech, assembly, association, suffrage and the right to 
run for public office would seem to allow democracy to disappear. The question of whether one 
ought to be able to give up voting rights in return for employment is similar to the ancient puzzle 
of whether someone ought to be allowed to contract oneself into slavery. In that latter case, the 
 
 
alleged inalienability of personal freedoms is often thought to make any such contract invalid. 
However, a similar demonstration of inalienability for political rights might falter since 
individual liberties (including such “economic liberties” as “the right to choose one’s vocation”) 
have generally been thought to trump equal access to the mechanisms for obtaining and using the 
vote or for gaining public office. Although it is true that those wanting to liberalize suffrage have 
increasingly (if slowly) won numerous battles against various opponents in the U.S., it is also the 
case that the national government has generally moved in the direction of stressing “private 
rights and commercial development over democratic participation” (Wood 1969, 562).  
Perhaps, however, the widespread attitude that political rights should be discounted in 
favor of what may be considered the more “basic” claims to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness 
is misplaced. It is doubtful in any case that there has been unanimity on that ranking. At the 
Federal Convention of 1787, Pierce Butler of South Carolina claimed that "[t]here is no right of 
which the people are more jealous than that of suffrage.”23 Before concluding the discussion of 
this issuer here I want to mention one populist attempt, by Herbert McClosky , to guarantee 
democracy (and overcome this democratic paradox of what may be voted on) by the exaltation of 
political rights above all others. It is a prototype of the approach that will be taken in this book. 
McClosky (1949, 653-654) writes. “It may appear a paradox, but democracy, though choice is of 
its essence, precludes one kind of choice: we cannot, under it, choose not to choose. We cannot, 
with democratic sanction, choose to cut ourselves off from those requirements that make all 
choice possible.” 
But how is this debacle to be prevented? According to McClosky (1949, 646) we must 
 
23 Kurland (1987, 49). 
 
 
…distinguish political freedoms, such as the freedom to participate in the 
choice of rulers, from non-political freedoms, like those often claimed for 
property or religion. The principle of majority rule recognizes no 
limitations on the power of the majority or its government except those 
that are essential to the attainment of freely- arrived-at majorities and to 
the maintenance of political consent and accountability. Freedoms 
associated with property…are of an entirely different order from…the 
freedoms to speak and publish. The latter are political freedoms, without 
which a majority rule system is impossible; they cannot, therefore, be 
legitimately abridged. Freedom of contract, on the other hand, may, so far 
as the majority principle is concerned, be regulated and controlled in 
whatever fashion the majority or its government deems best. Whether 
industry shall be nationalized or privately owned; whether wages shall be 
set by government or by private contract; whether polygamy shall be 
permitted…are matters that a democratic government…can, if it likes, 
control. It cannot, however, properly determine whether political criticism 
will be tolerated or whether elections should be abolished, for the right to 
oppose and the right to elect are among those political freedoms from 
which its power derives. 
This is an elegant resolution of the paradox, certainly, and it will come up again as we progress. 
But is there really a credible basis for accepting it? Why is it just those political rights mentioned 
by McClosky that are “inalienable,” and not any others, like those of life, liberty and property, 
set forth by Jefferson in The Declaration of Independence, protections which may seem even 
 
 
more fundamental? If democracy may be limited by one or two unbreakable principles, why not 
others? Is it just the convenience of paradox-smashing that causes McClosky to stop at the 
political axioms? Furthermore, how do we tell which ones actually are the political ones? For 
example, is habeas corpus political because its defiance could keep a political activist under 
wraps? And there is a more serious objection even than these: supposing we could precisely 
delimit the political principles, isn’t disregarding the rights enumerated in the Declaration a very 
dangerous move? One acute critic of populism, Wilmoore Kendall, warned of what might be the 
result of trivializing all but those rights that McClosky characterizes as political. Kendall 
suggests, sarcastically, that on McClosky’s view, we would be required to rely on the people’s 
good will with respect to all the other, “trivial” matters. For example, 
[W]e can trust the majority to delimit itself, and so can leave it free inter 
alia to set up extermination camps for Jewish children (not Jewish adults, 
because that would evidently prevent majorities from being freely-arrived-
at by silencing some electors) - and, presumably, to obligate the minority 
to pay tax-monies with which to defray their expenses (Kendall 1950, 
712). 
In what follows, I will give what support I can to the strategy of exalting political rights, 
but it cannot be denied that the objections to this approach are quite serious, and finding 
plausible replies to them is among the most important desiderata with which I will be concerned. 
It is my view that that here too the correct responses require what I have called “naturalizing,” 
not only of democratic theory, but of at least one segment of value-theory. We have, then, at 
least two obstacles to a naturalized conception of democracy. First, there’s the problem that 
while (1)-(5) seem mutually exclusive and exhaustive, none of them fits very with any theory 
 
 
according to which we must design electoral mechanisms to tell us something objective about 
what would make a polity better off, but that should not be expected to be “truth-tracking” with 
regard to any such facts. Second, we must reply to the objections that populist democracy not 
only suffers from paradox, but is consistent with fascism. It is easy to see how an otherwise 
attractive theory might be sunk by the jutting rocks of either of these. I believe however, that 
there is a safe passage that has been overlooked. I will begin to map it in Chapter Two. 
